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THE RELIABILITY OF SELF-REPORTED HOME 
VALUES IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT 
 
Marco González and Climent Quintana  
 
ABSTRACT 
  We analyze the reliability of homeowners’ estimates of the value of their houses, in a 
household survey (of poor suburbs) of a developing country. We show that non-response to 
the home value question by the owner is uncorrelated with the appraised value of the house 
and other demographic characteristics of the respondent. We also document that homeowners 
with long tenure largely overestimate the value of their home. Moreover, both the bias and the 
lack of precision in homeowners’ estimates are correlated with tenure, but not with 
socioeconomic characteristics. However, we also show that self-reported home values from 
short-tenure homeowners can be used to obtain unbiased and precise estimates of the average 
house value at the census tract level. 
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 1. Introduction 
1.1. Why should we care about the reliability of self-reported home values 
in developing countries?  
Economists and policymakers often are in need of a trustworthy measure of the 
wealth of families. For homeowners, any such measure would not be complete without an 
assessment of the market value of the family’s house. Housing wealth has been shown to be 
a key variable in decisions such as retirement (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007), 
consumption (e.g., Campbell and Cocco, 2007), savings (e.g., Juster et al., 2005; Klyuev 
and Mills, 2006), and the debt composition of the household (e.g., Disney, Bridges, and 
Gathergood, 2006).  
A family’s residence is often its single most valuable asset, particularly in 
developing countries where financial assets are not very common. By obtaining such a 
measure, we would be gathering important information about the overall financial position 
of consumers and their wellbeing, which would be useful in a myriad of applications. For 
example, information on home values is crucial to policymakers interested in implementing 
well-informed public policies in such areas as taxation and infrastructure provision. 
Moreover, if household economic behavior is based on perceived rather than actual wealth, 
this data could help to determine whether people systematically underestimate or 
overestimate their actual wealth endowments, and thus whether their economic decisions 
are suboptimal in an intertemporal context. For example, Agarwal (2007) finds that people 
who underestimate the value of their home are more likely to prepay their loans, while 
people who overestimate it are more likely to default on their loans.    
In many developing countries, homeowner estimates of property market price 
obtained through national household surveys may be the most convenient and reliable way 
of tracking home value. When declared transactions prices for homes are grossly 
underreported to the authority in order to evade taxes, the repeat sales methods that are 
common in the U.S. (like the S&P Case-Schiller index) to study home market dynamics 
become infeasible. In this paper, we assess the reliability of survey obtained homeowner 
estimates of house value in a developing country context (Acayucan, Mexico) and argue 
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 that the average home value estimates by short-tenure owners are reasonably unbiased and 
precise. 
1.2. Literature review on the reliability of self-reported home values 
In the United States, all the major household surveys—the decennial Census, the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the American Housing Survey, and the Survey of 
Consumer Finances—ask a question like “What is the value of this property; that is, how 
much do you think this property would sell for if it were for sale?” Also, a quick look at the 
World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) Survey Finder indicates that 
79 LSMS household surveys contain questions on household ownership and value. The 
main argument favoring the use of the question on home valuation is its ease of collection 
and wide availability. It is thus crucial to assess the reliability of self-reported home 
valuations. 
Several papers have sought to investigate the reliability of the answers to home 
valuation questions. In Kish and Lansing (1954), homeowners were asked to estimate the 
market value of their houses. Consequently, estimates for the same homes were made by 
professional appraisers. The main finding was that the average bias in people’s estimates 
was around zero. That is, although individuals’ estimates could be quite different from the 
appraised values, the errors seemed to be mean zero and would cancel out on average. This 
was an important finding justifying the use of the question in large surveys. Regarding the 
accuracy of the estimates, the researchers found that around 37 per cent of the responses 
were within an interval of ± 10 per cent of the appraiser’s estimate. When the researchers 
focused on different subgroups, their results showed that new homeowners made the most 
precise estimates of their house value, but there was no increase in accuracy if the 
respondent was exclusively the household head, if the respondent had more education, or if 
the agent was able to enter the property during the appraisal. 
Using the same methods and similar data as Kish and Lansing, Kain and Quigley 
(1972) confirmed that errors were largely offsetting, but that they were correlated with the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent. More education was associated with a 
smaller positive bias in the homeowner’s estimate. This research also inquired into the 
determinants of non-response to the question, and found that those with higher income, 
education, and lower tenure in the home were more likely to answer—that is, give an 
estimate of the value of the house, conditional on participating in the survey. Because the ideal estimate of the market price of a house is the sale price at the time 
of purchase, some studies have compared sales data for recently transacted homes with 
owners’ estimates. This method is used by Goodman and Ittner (1992). They compare 
owners’ estimates with subsequent sales prices of the same property using the 1985 and 
1987 American Housing Survey. They find that the average U.S. homeowner overestimates 
the value of his house by six per cent over what it actually sells for and that the average 
absolute error is around 14 per cent. The error is largely unrelated to the characteristics of 
the owner, the house, or the local market. One concern with Goodman and Ittner’s study, 
though, is that the estimates used were obtained from people who in all likelihood had been 
planning to sell and were probably gathering information on the value of their property 
before it was actually sold. This makes soon-to-be sellers markedly different from the rest 
of the population.  
Other studies that use the American Housing Survey to compare transaction prices 
with owner valuations include: DiPasquale and Somerville (1995) and Kiel and Zabel 
(1999). Consistent with Goodman and Ittner (1992), both studies find that, on average, 
owners’ valuations exceed transaction prices. Additionally, they find that longer tenured 
homeowners have a lower estimated value of their property, ceteris paribus. 
Another approach in some studies is to use tax assessments and compare them to 
people’s self-valuations, as in David (1968). The obvious problem with using tax 
assessments is that they are generated by local governments who charge property taxes. If 
the assessments are generated from what citizens report as the sale price, as in the case of 
Mexico, then there is an incentive compatibility problem, usually resulting in gross 
underestimations of the value of homes. If the data are obtained from independent 
assessments by government officials, then there is a tendency to update values infrequently 
because the higher property tax payments generated are unpopular. This results in a flawed 
assessment of housing value. 
Overall, these studies have found that, on average, owners tend to overestimate the 
value of their homes by around five per cent, that this overvaluation is unrelated to owner 
and home characteristics other than the length of tenure in the home, and that surveys can 
be reliably used to obtain reasonable estimates of home valuation at a very low cost. 
However, given that the existing literature has focused on developed countries (mainly the 
United States), it may not provide a good guide to results in developing countries, where housing market conditions may be different. Indeed, housing market conditions in 
developing countries differ from those in the United States in several dimensions: most 
importantly, access to land, construction, and financing, all of which generate a lower level 
of information about the distribution of house prices. 
1.3. Housing market conditions in developing countries  
In developed countries, access to land occurs mainly through purchases, while in 
poor countries it is not uncommon for a substantial proportion of urban growth to occur 
through squatting, especially for the poor. Inhabitants of cities can organize themselves and 
invade government lands, protected areas, and even private property. By the time tribunals 
establish the illegality of such actions, some politicians will find it attractive to provide 
protection and services to the squatters in exchange for votes and political support, rather 
than removing them from the ill-gained land. Local governments commonly engage in 
expropriation of land that is handed out later to political constituents. Those who acquire 
their property under such conditions have a harder time finding out what the monetary 
value of the property is, given that they did not initially pay for it. And, in many cases, the 
property cannot be sold easily for lack of a valid title. 
The second reason that housing markets are different in developing countries is that 
a much larger proportion of the housing stock tends to be self-built. The presence of self-
built houses, instead of developments by specialized construction companies, occurs 
because the financial system is underdeveloped, and mortgages are either nonexistent or 
very expensive. Families thus acquire a home in these conditions by building it themselves 
over long periods of time. The lack of developed mortgage markets can thus force families 
into inefficient construction methods because the house is built slowly over time. For 
example, the family may buy first a tin roof, and later on replace it with cement. Credit 
constraints can thus generate unnecessarily high construction costs. If people estimate their 
home’s worth as the sum of the expenses incurred in building it, housing markets where 
mortgages are non-existent may also present upwardly biased home value estimates as 
captured by surveys of homeowners.   
Another reason why self building can generate a lack of knowledge of the current 
market value of the property is by losing the following powerful information channel. 
When a group of homes is built by a construction company, there is a great degree of 
homogeneity of homes in the vicinity, so when one neighbor moves in or out, this will generate information on the current value of the surrounding properties. When housing is 
self-constructed, this information channel disappears, because the neighboring homes are 
not a very good proxy for the value of a family’s house. 
Jimenez (1982) provides one of the few studies for a developing country. Using data 
from an impoverished neighborhood in the Philippines, he finds that the mean value owner 
and appraiser estimates are not statistically distinguishable. His Philippine sample does 
well when compared with Kain and Quigley’s results for St. Louis differences in average 
valuations. However, for individual estimates, his results are rather different. The average 
of the absolute value of the differences between owner and appraiser valuations is 
approximately 55 per cent of the mean appraised value, while the comparable figure for 
Kain and Quigley is approximately 20 per cent. Jimenez also inquires whether the role of 
using owner versus appraiser valuation changes the relationship between housing prices 
and their characteristics. The overall results appear to be similar when a comparison is 
made between the coefficients of equations with different dependent variables (owner’s 
valuation and appraised valuation). The signs and magnitudes are roughly of the same order 
of magnitude. 
1.4. Contribution of this study 
This paper investigates the reliability of homeowners’ estimates of the value of their 
houses in the context of a developing country. Self-estimates of home value in such 
countries may be simply unreliable with thin housing markets and widespread non-market 
access to land and housing, including squatting. The research presented here complements 
and extends upon Jimenez’s work in at least three different ways. First, we try to determine 
how reliable self-valuations are, but also look at the magnitude of the bias, the accuracy of 
people’s answers, and their determinants. Second, we explore whether the relationship 
between housing prices and housing characteristics depends on the housing price estimate 
(owner’s estimate versus appraised value), with the advantage of having two independent 
measures for several housing characteristics. Finally, we show how our results can be used 
to generate estimates of average home values at the neighborhood or census tract levels. 
We use data from a household survey and appraisals for the same homes done by a 
real estate agent. The survey was applied from mid-February to mid-March 2006 to 
approximately 1,200 dwellings in the outskirts of the city of Acayucan, Veracruz in central 
Mexico. The head of the household or the spouse of the head of the household was interviewed, with the main respondent providing information about the rest of the family. A 
detailed description of the survey can be found in González-Navarro and Quintana-
Domeque (2007). For the purposes of this study, it is important to know that the city serves 
as the local trading centre in an agricultural and livestock-producing region. Its population 
is slightly less than 50,000 and incomes are somewhat lower than the Mexican average
1. 
We must emphasize that the sample used for this study is neither representative of 
developing countries nor of Mexico as a whole. However, it is a representative random 
sample of the outskirts of the city of Acayucan. The sampled areas of the city corresponded 
to the poorer parts of town, where streets are not paved, and many homes are lacking such 
important services as sewerage, running water, and indoor plumbing. 
1.5. Main results of this study 
Our findings suggest that the ability of homeowners to estimate own-residence 
value is mainly a function of how short their tenure is. Owners with long tenure 
overestimate by a large amount the value of their home (in some cases by more than 200 
%). However, families with short tenure have reasonably accurate and unbiased estimates 
of the value of their home, similar to what is found in the U.S. literature. Our regression 
analysis, where we control for the discrepancy in the lot size estimate between the owner 
and the real estate agent, several socioeconomic characteristics, housing characteristics and 
neighborhood effects, seems to confirm that both the bias and lack of accuracy in owners’ 
self-valuation reports are driven by tenure (years living in the house). Neither the bias nor 
the lack of accuracy in owners’ self-valuation reports is correlated with socioeconomic 
characteristics. Interestingly, we also find that item non-response is uncorrelated with the 
appraised value of the house. This suggests that unbiased estimates of the average value of 
a group of homes can be obtained through household surveys without being worried about 
selectivity concerns. Another interesting result is that inhabitants of neighborhoods with 
relatively homogenous homes built by a construction company appear to make unbiased 
and very precise home-value estimates. Finally, using hedonic regressions, we find that 
homeowners have trouble determining the plot size of their home in terms of square meters. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the owner’s estimate of the size of the lot is uncorrelated 
with the appraiser’s valuation. 
                                                 
1 According to the 2000 Census, 14 per cent of income earners made less than 1 minimum wage, while 33 per 
cent of Acayucans were in this category. 50 per cent of Mexicans earned at most two minimum wages, while 
70 per cent of Acayucans earned in this income bracket. Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data used 
in the paper. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 illustrates how these results could be 
used to generate estimates of mean home prices at the census tract level. In Section 5 the 
reliability of the real estate agent’s appraisals is investigated. Section 6 concludes. 
•  2. Data 
2.1. Data sources 
The owner-estimated home valuations come from the Acayucan Standards of Living 
Household Survey (ASLS) 2006 (González-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque, 2007). This 
household survey contains detailed information about demographic, income, education, and 
housing characteristics of the sampled population. Among the housing questions of the 
ASLS, one asked respondents to estimate the market value of their houses. Specifically, the 
question was phrased: “Approximately how much money do you think this house would 
sell for nowadays?”.                      The interviewed families mostly lived in small, single 
floor homes, with a wall-delimited lot.            Of the respondents, 51 per cent were spouses 
of the household head and 45 per cent were the household heads themselves. The survey 
had a response rate of 94 per cent. 
The other source of data in the study was the housing value assessments produced 
by a real estate agent. Having only one real estate agent perform all the assessments has the 
positive feature that heterogeneity of assessment practices, which require a lot of subjective 
decision-making, was minimized. The real estate agent was asked to visit one out of every 
two successfully interviewed homes and to assess the market value of the house. The 
appraisals then were matched to the interviews, with a success rate of almost 90 per cent. 
The assessments were performed within two months of the household interviews.  
Our study, as well as previous ones in this literature, did not ask the appraiser to 
enter a home to perform the valuation. The main reason for not doing so is that the 
homeowners would find such a request extremely intrusive. Given that this study is part of 
a larger ongoing research program which involves multiple survey rounds in the same 
homes, we decided against asking the appraiser to attempt entering the houses with the 
objective of minimizing future survey non-response. Another discarded strategy was asking the appraiser to accompany the survey team and perform his valuation concurrently with 
the interview. This was not done because in the pilot and in the experience of the survey 
company, most interviews would be performed at the entrance of the house, and few 
homeowners would actually allow the survey worker inside the house.  
One important advantage of our procedure is that we are the first to investigate what 
the appraised home values are for respondents that did not provide an answer to the 
question in the survey. Hence, unlike any previous study, we can look at whether non-
response to the home valuation question by the owner is related to home value as measured 
by the appraiser. Given that the professional appraisals were preformed within a two-month 
period after the survey, there are no concerns that house price inflation or volatility are 
relevant for our results. 
2.2. Socioeconomic and housing market characteristics 
Table 1 contains some of the main socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals 
surveyed. It is divided into three panels. The top panel shows descriptive statistics for the 
whole sample: 53 per cent of the persons in the sample are female, with an average age of 
28 years, and an average education level of seven years. The mean household size is four 
persons, and their monthly per capita expenditure is approximately $86 (2006 U.S. dollars) 
using market exchange rate, or $131 in PPP terms. For comparison purposes, the middle 
panel has similar variables for Mexican cities of the same size category. The surveyed 
sample is slightly older (two years), somewhat more educated, and has an almost identical 
mean household size to that of similar sized cities in Mexico. Regarding the respondents, 
78 per cent were female and the average age was 42 years. Respondents had around half a 
year more education than those in the whole sample. 
The survey fieldwork permitted us a deeper knowledge of the housing market in 
Acayucan than the survey instrument by itself would have provided. Already built homes 
were found to be acquired mostly in traditional ways: purchase, inheritance, or donation 
within the family. However, some of the families living in self-constructed homes, 
especially the poorer ones, had a peculiar way of acquiring the land. Frequently, poor 
people obtained their lots for a very modest payment (around 10% or 15% of the market 
price) from the municipality, which owns several tracts of land in the surrounding parts of 
the city. Many of the households in the sample that declared not having a property title had 
not formalized the protocol of transfer of property from the municipality. The other way that families acquired land in the outer parts of this city was through direct purchases from 
landowners who subdivided large plots of land for sale. In either case, families started out 
with no public services. The transacted plots usually were marked pieces of land with space 
left for streets that would eventually get electrification, pavement, and water services. 
TABLE 1: Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of survey sample, similar 
sized cities and respondents 
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Years of Schooling 
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Per Capita Expenditure 

























        


























        



























1 The numbers of observations for the household size and per capita expenditure variables refer to the number of 
dwellings, unlike the other variables, which refer to individuals. 
2 Data for similar sized cities from IPUMSI micro data, corresponding to the 2000 Census. 
3 Includes all respondents to the questionnaire, regardless of item non-response. 
 
We can provide two measures of the intensity of housing market transactions. First, 
looking at the Public Registry of Property in Acayucan, we see that over the course of 
2005, approximately two per cent of homes were registered as having been sold in 
Acayucan. This can be thought of as a minimum estimate of the proportion of transacted 
homes, because a fraction of those transactions that took place in 2005 had not been 
registered yet: new proprietors may decide to occupy the house first and pay the transaction 
taxes, which are necessary for the property to become publicly registered under the new 
owner’s name, later on. Second, our household survey provides information on the proportion of homes that were transacted during the year. In the sample, the percentage of 
owned-houses in which the respondent has been living for one year or less is 4.75 per cent. 
This can be thought of as an upper bound on the annual percentage of houses that are sold, 
because some of these homes are being “entrusted” to the occupants by friends or family. 
This intensity of transaction, between 2 per cent and 4.75 per cent, compares to that of the 
United States of five per cent per year (Goodman and Ittner, 1992). 
In the completed surveys, the item response rate for the owners’ estimate of the 
house value was approximately 74 per cent. Interestingly, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the average appraised value is equal for respondents who did and did not provide a 
house value estimate. Indeed, Table 2 shows that the probability of response is not related 
to the appraised home value conditional on age, sex of the respondent, household head 
status, having a property title, tenure (years living in the house) and 16 neighborhood 
dummies. Additionally, age, sex, household head status, having a property title and tenure 
are not related to the probability of response. This suggests homeowners that do not provide 
an estimate of house value are a random subset of our sample. This is an important finding 
if home owner valuations are to be used to estimate average home prices in a locality.  
2.3. Characteristics of owner-occupied homes reported by the owner and 
the real estate agent 
Table 3 presents some relevant characteristics of the houses that are the focus of this 
study: owner-occupied homes
2. In terms of the size of the lot, the estimates are 240 m² and 
130 m² for the owners and the appraiser, respectively. The difference in assessed lot size by 
the appraiser and the respondents is large and significant. The average house in the sample 
has 2.5 rooms
3, and surprisingly, only 63 per cent of the dwellings have a bathroom inside 
the house. Cement roofing is not the norm in the sample: 60 per cent of dwellings have a 
roof made out of metal sheets, asbestos, or palm leaves. Further, 12 per cent of homes did 
not report having a property title. We also realize that there is a large discrepancy in the 
average value obtained from the owners and the real estate agent. The average owner’s 
estimated home value is $19,948, while the average appraisal is only $12,123. The median 
                                                 
2 Although the appraiser performed around 600 valuations, 26 per cent were not used due to a lack of 
response from homeowners (item non-response), and another 30 per cent were lost due to the respondents not 
being homeowners. 
3 Rooms here refer to the number of rooms in the house, excluding the kitchen, for any use, not necessarily 
for sleeping.difference, although much smaller ($1,545), and the mean log difference, are also 
significantly different for both measures.  
TABLE 2: Determinants of response to the home valuation question. Probit estimates.  
Marginal effects evaluated at the mean are reported 
          
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 

























































































































Pseudo-R2 0.00 0.08  0.08  0.08 0.09 
Sample Size  363  359  359  357  350 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (52 clusters). Neighborhood dummies: 16 dummies 
based on the first three digits of the AGEB (Mexican geographical unit) classification system. 
 
In the paper, we assume that the real estate agent valuation is very close to the 
market value of the house. We think that it is reasonable to interpret the discrepancy 
between home values obtained from the owners and the real estate agent as originating 
from homeowner’s misperceptions about home market value. There are several reasons 
justifying such an interpretation. First, the appraiser has a more sensible estimate of the lot 
size (one of the most important determinants of home value according to the real estate 
agent) than the owners. Second, the real estate agent seems to infer accurately other 
housing characteristics. Third, he is likely to be cognizant of the market forces involved in 
dwellings valuation in squatter communities. Let us now explain these claims. TABLE 3: Characteristics of owner occupied homes 
          
Self-Assessed Measures           
 Obs.  Mean.  SD  Median  Mean 
Log 
 
Home Value ($ US) 
Lot Size Estimate (m2) 
Property Title 
Tenure 
Number of Rooms* 




























































          
Appraiser Measures           
 
Home Value ($ US) 
Lot Size Estimate (m2) 













































          
 Corr.  Difference  of 
Means 
Diff. of Mean Logs 
 
Home Value ($ US) 
Lot Size Estimate (m2) 






























* Number of rooms excluding kitchen. 
p-values for the statistical significance of the correlation coefficients are reported in parentheses and p-values from 
paired t-tests of equality of means are reported in brackets. 
 
 
2.4. First Claim: The appraiser has a more sensible estimate of the lot size 
than the owners  
During the fieldwork, we realized that homeowners seemed to have difficulties 
calculating area. On the other hand, the real estate agent may have a faulty impression of 
the lot size of the property. However, the latter seems unlikely. Although the real estate agent did not have access to the interior of the home, he could observe the entire lot and 
knew where the property lines fell, given that homes are delimited by low height walls or 
fences in the survey area. Moreover, his ability, skills and training in performing home 
valuation are expected to be much better than those for the owners. Hence, we expect that 
he provides better estimates of the lot size than the owners. Fortunately, we can provide 
some evidence supporting such a claim. Note that since lot sizes are correlated within a 
street block, the between-blocks variance of lot sizes should be larger than the within-
blocks variance. When this is tested, the equality of within and between variance cannot be 
rejected for the self-respondents’ lot size estimate, while it is rejected for the appraiser. 
That is, for the agent’s lot size estimate, the average between-block deviation is 
significantly larger than the average within-block deviation. This suggests that the appraiser 
has a more sensible estimate of the lot size than the residents. Note that all of the appraisals 
were performed by the same real estate agent. Hence, the previous finding cannot be due to 
different real estate agents conducting appraisals in different neighbourhoods
4.  
2.5. Second Claim: The appraiser infers accurately other housing 
characteristics  
Given that the appraiser did not enter the properties, this may suggest that he erred 
substantially in determining internal and less visible housing features (whether the house 
had a bathroom inside the house or sewage system) but was much better at determining 
external and more visible housing features (whether the home had cement roofing and 
cement walls), as the means and correlations in the Table may suggest. However, a careful 
look at our data reveals that the real estate agent was very accurate in predicting both types 
of housing characteristics. Indeed, the real estate agent correctly guessed the presence of a 
bathroom within the house in 67 per cent of the valuations, 78 per cent for cement roofing, 
87 per cent for sewerage, 94 per cent for cement walls and 95 per cent for cement floor. 
That is, the real estate agent appears to have accurate information on housing 
characteristics.  
                                                 
4 Another possible explanation for the large dispersion in lot-size estimates is that survey respondents confuse 
lot size with construction size. If this were the case, the data would show a positive correlation between 
appraised building size and the error measures. This was not the case, so we discard this hypothesis in our 
data. 2.6. Third Claim: The appraiser is likely to be cognizant of the market forces 
involved in dwellings valuation in squatter communities 
The vitality of the housing market in Acayucan is big enough to provide information 
on market forces (supply and demand) to the appraiser. Our estimate of the annual intensity 
of housing transactions in Acayucan is between two percent and 4.75 per cent. This 
suggests that the professional appraiser is likely to be cognizant of the market forces 
involved in dwelling valuation in a squatter community, given that his work consists of 
market value appraisals for bank loans, and property sales advisory services.  
Before concluding this section, it is worth arguing that homeowners’ estimates may 
be the only potentially widely available source of house market prices in a developing 
country. Given that the housing market consists of private transactions between different 
parties, and that property tax laws generate a tendency to underreport the transaction price 
to the authorities, home value estimates like those used in the U.S. that depend on reported 
transaction prices are simply not reliable sources of market value in many developing 
countries. In Section 5, we study a subset of recently sold single-family properties in 
Acayucan and obtain market value measures from the tax authorities, the professional 
appraisal, the homeowner declared transaction price, and current valuation. These measures 
were obtained with the objective of assessing the reliability of professional appraisals in 
capturing market transaction prices. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. The Relationship between Owners’ Estimates and Appraised Estimates 
The analysis presented below only uses data from households in which the owner 
lives with the interviewed family, eliminating answers from families that rent or borrow 
their homes. Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients between the owner’s estimate and 
the appraised value for the owners’ sample and for some interesting subsamples. For the 
owners’ sample, the correlation between the logs of these two measures is 0.42. The 
correlation increases slightly to 0.43 when the sample is restricted to owner-occupied 
homes with a property title. One interesting phenomenon is that lower tenure in the house is 
associated with a larger correlation between the two measures. The correlation increases to 0.61 for owners with less than two years of tenure. For those with longer tenure (three years 
or more) the correlation is 0.40. This finding is consistent with the standard explanation 
given in the housing literature: recent movers have more accurate information about the 
value of their home, since their reports are likely to be close approximations to the market 
value at the time of purchase. 
TABLE 4: Correlation of owners’ estimates and appraisals 
        




















































Notes: Pa and Ps refer to the professionally appraised home value and the self assessed home value, respectively. 
 
In Table 5, we tabulated a partition of the owner’s estimates as a proportion of the 
appraiser’s estimates. Two main features of this table stand out. First, only 11 per cent of 
the estimates by respondents are within 10 per cent of the appraiser’s estimates. Second, the 
two measures do not seem to be closely related: 25 per cent of respondents think their home 
is worth at most 70 per cent of its appraised value. Meanwhile, 35 per cent of respondents 
think their home is worth at least 150 per cent of its appraised value. 
 






























Notes: Authors’ calculations. These findings contrast with the existing evidence for developed countries. For 
example, Kish and Lansing (1954) and Kain and Quigley (1972) respectively report that 
only six per cent and 12 per cent of the respondents in their sample assessed their home 
value to be less than 70 per cent of the appraised one. Meanwhile, nine per cent and eight 
per cent estimated it to be larger than 150 per cent of the appraised value, and 26 per cent 
and 37 per cent had an estimate within 90-109 per cent of the real estate agent’s estimate. 
This suggests that relative to the United States, our survey respondents’ are less precise in 
their estimate of home value. However, our results are in line with those for developing 
countries. In Jimenez (1982), 25 per cent of respondents think their home is at worth most 
70 per cent of the real estate agent’s estimate, 41 per cent estimated it to be larger than 150 
per cent of the appraised value, and eight per cent had an estimate within 90-109 per cent of 
the real estate agent’s appraised value.  
We now turn to a description of the bias and inaccuracy of owners’ estimates. Table 
6 shows the average degree of error and lack of precision in owners’ estimates for the 
different subsamples. As in the previous literature, our results are shown for different 
measures of bias (the difference between owner’s and appraisal’s home value estimates, 
and the percentage difference in terms of appraisal’s estimate) and inaccuracy (the absolute 
difference and the absolute percentage difference). 
Using all owners in the sample (first column) the average difference between 
owner’s estimate and appraised value is around $7,800; this means that owners tend to 
largely overestimate the value of their home. The mean percentage difference is close to 
124 per cent of the appraised value. In terms of inaccuracy or lack of precision, the mean 
absolute difference is approximately $13,500. This is evidence of how different the 
appraiser’s estimates are from those of the homeowners’: on average, the people in the 
sample have an unrealistically high estimate of the value of their home. These results 
contrast with the available evidence for the U.S. and the Philippines. Both Kain and 
Quigley (1972) in St. Louis and Jimenez (1982) in the Philippines report a mean percentage 
difference of less than 0.5 per cent. In terms of precision, we also find very different results. 
In our sample, the absolute percentage difference is estimated to be more than 150 per cent, 
while this is approximately 55 per cent in Jimenez, and 20 per cent in Kain and Quigley. 
Note that our sample size (267 observations) is higher than the ones used in Jimenez (96 
observations) and Kain and Quigley (113 observations).  
 TABLE 6: Owners’ average bias and inaccuracy 
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Clusters 52  38  11  16  1 
Sample Size  267  101  12  23  14 
Notes: Clustered robust p-values are reported in parentheses (52 clusters), except in column (5), which corresponds to 
a regression for cluster number 11. 
 
Figure 1 pinpoints one source of error in homeowners’ valuations. In the Figure, 
people’s valuations are divided into deciles according to the real estate agent’s appraised 
value of the house. For each of those deciles, the mean error is calculated and plotted in the 
Figure. The graph suggests that people who live in homes with appraised market value in 
excess of $10,000 have a much better idea of how much their home is worth. The much 
noisier observations are clustered mostly where valuations are less than $10,000. This 
suggests that people who live in very low-value homes tend to grossly overestimate the 
value of their home, while those who live in more expensive homes have much smaller 
biases. Although this is quite different from what was documented in Kish and Lansing 
(1954), who find a close-to-zero bias for every group of appraised value, Martinelli and 
Parker (2008) point out that a small amount of misreporting may be due to embarrassment 






























Documentation of the bias and inaccuracy for owners with a high appraised value 
(in excess of $10,000), is presented in the second column of Table 6. The error is much 
smaller, as the graph suggested. However, learning that people who live in low value 
homes have a very large upward bias in own-home-value estimates is scarcely useful for 
the purpose of determining whether household surveys can be used to infer home values. If 
both groups declare large home values, then it is impossible to distinguish each group 
without professional appraisals. However, the analysis that follows will suggest that years-
of-tenure is the only significant predictor of bias and lack of precision in home value 
estimates.  
The error and inaccuracy for short-tenure owners (less than either one or two years 
of tenure) are reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 6. It turns out that if the 
analysis is restricted to owners with a short tenure, the mean bias of the estimates is not 
statistically different than zero; the same holds for mean percentage error. The absolute 
percentage error also is reduced by over 50 per cent. 
In the introduction we mentioned that one of the differences between developed and 
non-developed housing markets was the lack of home construction by specialized companies, and that this generated less information about the distribution of home prices 
for people inhabiting those homes. The last column of the Table, column fifth, isolates the 
set of homes that were not self-built and estimates the bias and precision of homeowners’ 
estimates. For this subgroup, the mean error and the mean percentage error are not 
statistically different from zero, while the absolute percentage error is the smallest of the 
five groups presented in the Table (33%). Although we are not aware of any study 
measuring the magnitude of the inefficiency in construction costs generates by credit 
constraints, owners of self-built homes may provide upwardly biased estimates because 
building over time is more expensive than doing it in one step by a specialized company.  
The findings in the second, third and fourth columns of the Table are reconciled by 
the observation that owners with many years in the same home have lower appraised home 
values. However, longer tenure is also correlated with higher self-assessed home value.  
The evidence presented up to now suggests two hypotheses: recent homeowners 
provide an unbiased estimate of home value, and/or high value homeowners provide 
unbiased estimates of home value. In Table 7 we test these two hypotheses. The Table is 
divided into four panels, one for each of the bias and accuracy measures. The top-left panel, 
corresponding to the error measure (Ps – Pa), presents the predicted error for each of the 
four analyzed cases: long-tenure or short-tenure and high-value or low-value house. The p-
value from a joint test of significance for the coefficients is reported in parenthesis. As was 
discussed above, the panel indicates that short-tenure homeowners have zero mean bias. 
High-value homeowners also have mean zero bias. The fact that there is mean zero bias for 
short-tenure and low-value homeowners is important. It confirms that an unbiased estimate 
of home value can be obtained using the answers of short-tenure homeowners, and that the 
misreporting due to embarrassment among families in low-value houses (Martinelli and 
Parker, 2008) may be less important than misreporting due to lack of information about the 
housing market, at least in a developing country context like the one in Acayucan. 
The top-right panel, focusing on mean percentage error, also finds a mean zero 
percentage error if the focus group is short-tenure homeowners. Mean absolute error 
(bottom-left panel) is halved when we focus on short-tenure homeowners. Finally, the 
bottom-right panel indicates that short-tenure homeowners present a third of the mean 
absolute percentage error of long-tenure homeowners. Hence, the bottom line seems to be 
that an unbiased and reasonably precise estimate can be obtained from homeowners with 
low tenure, even if the value of those homes is small. TABLE 7: Tests of bias and inaccuracy according to tenure and appraised home value 
Model:  
Dependent variable = ￿ + ￿1Ilong tenure + ￿2Ihigh value +￿￿3Ilong tenureIhigh value
OLS estimates 
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 Dep.  variable: 
Absolute Error  
|Ps – Pa| 
 Dep.  variable: 
Absolute Per. Error  
|(Ps – Pa) /Pa| 
 
























































Clustered robust p-values (52 clusters) for test of joint significance of ￿ = 0, ￿ + ￿1 = 0, ￿ +￿2 = 0, and ￿ +￿1+￿2 +￿3 
= 0, are reported in parentheses. 
Ilong tenure = 1 if tenure is two years or more, 0 otherwise, and Ihigh value = 1 if the property is assessed at more than 
$10,000, 0 otherwise￿ 
3.2. Determinants of Individual Bias and Inaccuracy 
The results presented until now suggest that long tenure is responsible for the bias 
and inaccuracy in home owners estimates. This subsection explores the role of tenure in a 
regression setting. Our purpose is to obtain the effect of tenure on the bias and the lack of 
precision of homeowners’ estimates conditional on other factors that may be related to 
tenure, bias and lack of precision.  Conversations with the real estate agent suggested that one of the most important 
determinants of the value of the home is the lot size. We already noted the discrepancy 
between the estimates of the lot size reported by the owners and appraised by the real estate 
agent. This discrepancy may be related to both tenure and the discrepancy between the 
valuations, so it is important to include the discrepancy in lot size into the regressions. 
Although perhaps this is the most important channel of discrepancy in home valuations that 
can be related to tenure, some other factors may play a role. To account for the influence of 
these other factors, we add several other controls: socioeconomic characteristics (namely, 
years of schooling of the respondent, a dummy for having a property title, and the log of 
monthly per capita expenditure) and several housing characteristics reported by the owner 
(an indicator for whether walls are made out of cement, an indicator for whether the roof is 
made out of cement, an indicator for whether the floor is made out of cement, an indicator 
for whether the bathroom is inside the dwelling, and the number of rooms). Moreover, we 
also include neighborhood fixed effects (16 neighborhood dummies based on the first three 
digits of the AGEB (Mexican census tract unit) classification system) to account for 
environmental and spatial characteristics related to tenure, bias and lack of precision. 
Finally, we must also bear in mind that although our sample is restricted to owned 
dwellings, the respondent is either the head of the household or his spouse, but she is not 
necessarily the owner of the dwelling. This is important, because the spouse may be less 
accurate than the household head. We acknowledge that by including an indicator variable 
that takes on value one if the respondent is the head of the household, and zero if she is the 
spouse. All the regressions use robust clustered standard errors at the street level to account 
for the correlation between observations within the same street
5. 
The results in Table 8 show that the unique statistically significant correlate of large 
bias and less accuracy is long tenure. Surprisingly, neither the discrepancy in the lot size 
estimate nor the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent seem to have an effect on 
either the error or the lack of precision of homeowners’ estimates. 
                                                 
5 Given the small sample size relative to the number of streets (56 clusters), street fixed effects are not 
controlled for in our regressions. Nevertheless, we control for neighborhood fixed effects (there are 16 
neighborhoods). TABLE 8: Determinants of individual bias and inaccuracy  
OLS estimates. 
 
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable:  (Ps – Pa) (Ps – Pa)/Pa |Ps – Pa| |(Ps – Pa)/Pa| 
 
























































































        
        
Housing characteristics?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value F-test 0.69  0.21  0.32  0.21 
        
Neighborhood dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value F-test 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 












1 The discrepancy in lot size is defined differently in every column. In the first column as (ms
2 – ma




2, in the third column as |ms
2 – ma




All regressions include a constant term. Housing characteristics: number of rooms, cement floor dummy, cements 
wall dummy, cement roof dummy, and bathroom within the dwelling. Neighborhood dummies: 16 dummies based 
on the first three digits of the AGEB (Mexican geographical unit) classification system. 
Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (52 clusters). 
*     Significant at the 10%. 
**   Significant at the 5%. 
*** Significant at the 1%.  
     
3.3. Determinants of Housing Value 
In this subsection, and following Jimenez (1982), we aim at determining the role of 
different characteristics of dwellings on their values, and whether the use of owner versus 
appraiser valuation changes this relationship. We estimate housing prices equations based on hedonic price analysis (Rosen, 
1974), that is, housing prices measures are regressed on housing and neighborhood 
characteristics. While Jimenez just had one available measure for each housing 
characteristic, we have two available independent measures, one reported by the owner and 
the other reported by the appraiser, for several housing characteristics: size of the lot, an 
indicator whether there is a bathroom within the dwelling, the presence of sewerage system, 
and indicators of cement walls, cement roof and cement floor.  
Table 9 presents the results of the hedonic price equations. Column (1) shows the 
results from a hedonic price equation using only information provided by the owner. Our 
estimates suggest that a 1 per cent increase in the lot size is related to a 0.32 per cent 
increase in the price of the house. Homes with a sewerage system have, on average, 40 per 
cent higher value than those without it, while homes with cement roof are worth, on 
average, 50 per cent more than those that use makeshift roofing. Finally, homes with 
cement walls have a value difference, on average, of 71 per cent with respect to those that 
use carton metal sheet walls.  
In column (2) we use the same variables as in column (1) but we use the appraiser’s 
home value estimate rather than the owner’s estimate. The results appear to be very similar, 
at least in qualitative terms. However, the owner’s estimate of the lot size does not predict 
the appraiser’s home value. This suggests that the owner’s estimate of the lot size is very 
noisy. 
Comparing column (3) with column (1) reveals that including the owner’s estimate 
of the size of the lot does not seem to be crucial when predicting housing valuation by the 
owner. The adjusted–R2 does not change too much from the model in column (1), which 
includes the owner’s estimated lot size (0.34) to the model in column (3), which excludes it 
(0.30). If instead of using the characteristics reported by the owner we use the ones reported 
by the appraiser, a similar picture emerges: the adjusted–R2 does not change too much 
from the model in column (4), which includes the appraiser’s estimated lot size (0.25), to 
the model in column (5), which excludes it (0.22). Again, this finding is consistent with our 
suspicion that the owner’s lot size estimate is a very noise measure of the actual lot size. TABLE 9: Hedonic price equations 
OLS estimates 
              
  Owner’s characteristics Appraiser’s characteristics Owner’s characteristics  
but 
Appraiser’s Ln(Lot size)
                


























































































































































































Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
p-value F-test    0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Test: Equality of coefficients 
                                                          p-value  (1) = (2):                                                                                                      p-value (7) = (8):
  Ln(Lot size)      0.00          0.02 
  Bathroom 
  Sewage 
  Cement Floor 
  Cement Walls 
  Cement Roof 






































All regressions include a constant term. Neighborhood dummies: 16 dummies based on the first three digits of the AGEB (Mexican geographical 
unit) classification system. 
Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (52 clusters). 
*     Significant at the 10%. 
**   Significant at the 5%. 
*** Significant at the 1%.  
 
 Looking at column (6), we observe that 84 percent of the variation in appraised 
value can be explained by the appraiser’s assessment of lot size, whether the property has 
an interior bathroom, a sewerage system, cement floors, cement walls and a cement roof. 
The high explanatory power of the regression reported in column (6) contrasts with the 30 
per cent of the variation in self-reported value explained by the same housing 
characteristics but reported by the owner, column (1). The more than 40 per cent difference 
in the explanatory power between regressions in column (1) and column (6) is likely to be 
driven by three main factors: first, while owners are a heterogeneous group, the assessor is 
just one person. The owner-idiosyncratic component cannot be accounted for in column (1), 
since we cannot use owner-fixed effects, but the appraisal-idiosyncratic component can be 
absorbed by the constant term in column (6); second, the real estate agent is likely to follow 
a highly routinized appraisal procedure; and third, the real estate agent is likely to have both 
higher ability and better skills in housing valuation (indeed, this is his main task in his job), 
and he is also likely to have higher information regarding general housing market 
conditions (remember that our estimate of the intensity of housing transactions is  between 
two per cent and 4.75 per cent).  
Column (7) reports the estimates from a regression of the price of home value 
estimated by the owner on the lot size estimated by the appraisal and on the rest of housing 
characteristics reported by the owner. The reason for performing such a regression is 
twofold: first, we have already seen that the appraiser’s estimate of the size of the lot is 
more reliable than the one reported by the owner of the house; second, owners should be 
more accurate in knowing whether the dwelling has a bathroom inside the house, whether 
the roof, floor and walls are made of cement, whether they have a sewerage system, and so 
forth. Reassuringly, the coefficients in column (7) are very similar to those reported in 
column (1). For the sake of comparison, column (8) reports a similar regression but using 
the appraised home value as a dependent variable. 
Finally, the Table reports the p-values for the equality of the coefficients between 
columns (1) and (2) and between columns (7) and (8) in order to investigate whether the 
relationships between home value and their characteristics are sensitive to the measure of 
home valuation. Interestingly, we reject the hypothesis that the relationship between home 
value and size of the lot is the same depending on the home value measure used in the 
analysis. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationships between home 
value and other housing characteristics are the same depending on the home value measure 
used in the analysis. These findings are consistent with the view that the real estate agent provides more sensible estimates of the lot size than the owners, and with the fact that he 
correctly determined housing characteristics without entering the properties. 
4. Application: Calculating Average Home Values 
In this section, mean house values are estimated at the census tract level to study the 
performance of the self-reported value depending on tenure status. As we argued earlier, 
self-reported value among homeowners with short tenure provides the preferred estimate of 
house value. The sample at hand is hardly adequate for the short-tenure measure because 
we obtained mean home value for nine census tracts from only 12 observations. However, 
as Table 10 shows, in terms of both bias and inaccuracy, using the short-tenure responses 
provides superior estimates to using the set of all responses. 
TABLE 10: Estimation of mean house values at the census tract level 
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Notes: The lower panel means are calculated over the groups in the top panel. 
 
The two measures of bias (mean difference and mean percent difference) show that 
using only the information for short-tenure homeowners provides a less biased estimate of 
the mean house value. The inaccuracy (measured by both the mean absolute difference and 
the mean absolute percent difference) is also improved when using only information on 
home valuation by short-tenure homeowners.  5. Comparing the Real Estate Agent’s Appraisals to Market Prices 
The analysis presented in Section 3 relied crucially on the assumption that the 
appraisal’s estimated values are unbiased estimates of the market price of the house. Hence, 
the discrepancy between home values obtained from the owners and the real estate agent is 
interpreted as originating from homeowner’s misperceptions about home market value. At 
the end of Section 2, we offered several reasons for why we think that that is a reasonable 
assumption. In order to check the validity of this assumption, we sought to compare the 
agent’s appraisals to market prices. The data collection and comparison results are 
presented in this section. 
Property transactions registered in 2006 in Acayucan were obtained from the Public 
Registry of Property. Each reported transaction had an address, owner’s name, sale price, 
and a city assessed value of the property. Municipal property tax in Acayucan is charged 
using the maximum of the last reported transaction price and the city assessed value of the 
property. Only urban houses were considered in the study, not empty lots or rural properties 
reported in the Public Registry. Inherited or donated homes were ignored, because the focus 
of the validation was on properties that had been sold. 
A professional survey team visited the homes that satisfied these characteristics in 
early 2007 and administered a short survey. If the owner or his spouse were not available, 
the survey was not administered. The survey inquired about the date the property was 
acquired, if any improvements had been made, how much they thought the current value of 
the property was, and how much they had paid for it. Table 11 shows descriptive statistics 
on the four available home value measures for the set of homes obtained from the Public 
Registry. The tests of equality of means reported in the lower part of the Table indicate that 
the transaction price declared by the homeowners is significantly lower than the appraised 
value. Assuming that the transaction prices are the best indicator of market prices, the data 
would lead us to conclude that the appraiser significantly overestimates the value of homes. 
In light of the results of Section 3, homeowners would seem to have an even larger positive 
bias than we found earlier. 
However, assuming that interviewed homeowners are reporting the price they 
actually paid may be excessively naïve. A comparison of the first and fourth columns of the 
Table indicates that: either homes in Acayucan have benefitted from a real home appreciation rates in excess of 26 per cent per year or that homeowners are not reporting the 
real transaction price in the interview.  
TABLE 11: Descriptive statistics of different house value estimates 
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Pm = Pt (0.55) 
Pm = Pa 
(0.00) 
Pm = Ps 
(0.00) 
Pt = Pa (0.00) 
Pt = Ps 
(0.00) 
 




Notes: Test of equality of means using all paired observations available for both measures. 
 
During the course of the fieldwork, municipal tax authorities, public notaries, and 
the real estate agent all mentioned that the tax values obtained from the Public Registry 
would be substantially lower than the market prices because people tended to underreport 
the true sale price of the house. If people underreported in order to pay fewer taxes, then it 
is very likely that they also underreported to the field workers when they were surveyed. 
The declared market price obtained from the interview is indistinguishable from the tax 
value of the property. The discrepancy between the tax value and the appraised value is 
around 44 per cent of the appraised value. It seems then that the obtained “market prices” 
are suspect, preventing us from credibly using this data source to test whether the real estate 
agent provides unbiased and accurate estimates of market home values. The third and 
fourth columns of the Table suggest, as was found in Section 3, that among recent 
homeowners, appraised values are close to the self-valuations of property value. 
Although we made every effort possible to obtain market prices to benchmark the 
professional appraised values, obtaining market prices in this context proved elusive. This 
fact underscores the importance of our paper. Homeowner estimated market values seem to 
be the only widely available home value measure in a developing country such as Mexico, 
and testing its reliability is important before widely using this measure of house values. 
Finally, although we could not test whether the assessed home value provides us with an 
unbiased estimate for the market value, it is important to point out the empirical evidence reported by Clapp and Giaccotto (1992), who compare repeat sales with assessed values, 
suggests that the effect of measurement error associated with assessed value is negligible.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper inquired how reliable homeowners’ estimates of the value of their houses 
are in the context of a developing country. Remarkably, the distribution of the bias in 
owner-appraiser valuations in Acayucan is very similar to the one reported for the 
Philippines in the study by Jimenez (1982). Hence, our empirical evidence on the lack of 
precision of homeowners’ estimates confirms existing results. We also show that the 
valuation bias associated with longer tenure is positive, confirming the results found in the 
U.S. studies for recently transacted homes. Our main contribution is the finding that the 
tenure driven bias is potentially much larger in a developing country context. The results 
show that, in our sample, owners with long tenure largely overestimate the value of their 
home, with a mean absolute percent error on the order of 150 per cent. However, families 
with tenure of less than two years have reasonably accurate and unbiased estimates of the 
value of their home; similar to what is found in the U.S. literature. A cluster of similar 
homes built by a specialized construction company shows zero bias and dramatically 
improved precision of estimation with respect to the other subgroups. 
We found item non-response to be uncorrelated with the appraised value of the 
house and other demographic characteristics; this suggests that unbiased estimates of the 
average value of group of homes can be obtained through household surveys. This is useful 
because if this were not the case, responses would have to be adjusted using sample 
selectivity methods which always rely on specific functional form assumptions that cannot 
be tested and can drive entirely the results. 
However useful surveys may be to estimate average home values in a group of 
homes, though, anyone using the estimated home value for studies of individual behavior 
should be aware that the mean absolute percentage error was found to be between 50 per 
cent and 60 per cent of the appraised home value among short-tenured homeowners in this 
study. Although it is also reassuring that bias and inaccuracy were not robustly related to 
socioeconomic characteristics, like family income or level of education of the respondent. 
To sum up, the results of this study caution against using homeowner estimates for 
analysis of individual behavior, but suggest that these estimates can be used to reasonably approximate mean home values for groups of homes (for example, at the census tract level). 
If the objective is to estimate average home value, then the answers from homeowners with 
short tenure may be used successfully in future work in surveys in developing countries. 
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